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E.H. Gombrich. The Sense of Order: A Study in the 
Psychology of Decorative Art. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1979. 411 pp., illustrations. $38.50. 
Reviewed by D.N. Perkins 
Project Zero, Harvard University 
The Sense of Order and the Perils of Explanation 1 
Would Martians have wallpaper? Perhaps they would, 
according to the deliberations of E. H. Gombrich in his 
intellectually and visually impressive new book, The 
Sense of Order: A Study in the Psychology of Decora-
tive Art. Not that Gombrich ever writes about Martians. 
His explicit concern is with the human perceiver and 
maker of decorative design. Nonetheless, if we read 
Gombrich for his essential logic rather than only his 
earthbound subject, he seems to say something about 
Martians, too. 
The first thing to be understood is that The Sense of 
Order undertakes several missions at once. It gives us 
a history of attitudes toward ornament, documenting 
many degrees of approbation and condemnation up to 
the severe verdict of Alfred Laos, who, in a 1908 es-
say, damned ornament as primitive, criminal, and de-
generate and urged that functionalism govern appear-
ance. The Sense of Order provides a tour of the variety 
of decoration, ranging from the simple and subtle 
statement of a Japanese bowl to the numbing intricacy 
of the Alhambra. The book samples the history of or-
namentation, tracking the evolution of ornamental mo-
tifs; for example, the survival and spread of the mod-
eled face of a lion with a ring in its mouth 2500 years 
ago in the mind of a Greek artist. Whatever the theme, 
the points are profusely illustrated by photographs and 
drawings in the text, an extensive section of larger 
black-and-white photographs, and a number of color 
plates. Gombrich is determined to have us see what he 
means. 
But of all these missions, the most vigorous, and the 
one which subsumes the others, is the quest for ex-
planation. Gombrich is a determined explicator. He 
wants to account for our responsiveness to ornament 
in terms of the nature of knowledge and the process of 
obtaining knowledge. He wants to explain the shift 
away from elaborate ornamentation with the advent of 
the machine age, which, by making mechanical repro-
duction possible devalued complexity. He wants to ac-
count for the heights of ornamental elaboration as 
products of an evolving craft rather than as the abrupt 
inventions of individuals. He even tries his hand at ex-
plaining why vertical stripes make for thinness, and 
horizontal for fatness. Gombrich by no means invents 
all such accounts; he often discourses on the ideas of 
others, making a judicious selection. But one way or 
another, his commitment to explanation in an area as 
psychologically messy as the arts is striking. 
In fact, this emphasis suggests an approach to un-
derstanding The Sense of Order better and appraising 
its success: What sorts of explanations are offered, 
and just how adequate are they? Such questions are 
best pondered after a brief explanation of explanation 
itself. Israel Scheffler (1963), in part of his The Anat-
omy of Inquiry, clarifies what an explanation ought to 
accomplish. Here, only the barest sketch can be given. 
In general, explanation means subsuming the event to 
be explained under laws or principles. On the one 
hand, the principles must be sound for a sound ex-
planation. On the other, the principles, plus particular 
conditions specific to the occasion, should deductively 
imply the event. For example, the properties of phos-
phorus, plus conditions on the rate, force, and so on, 
of striking a match on a particular occasion, imply that 
the match would light, and so explain the event. In 
fact, informal explanations often are elliptical, omitting 
some conditions that would be required for strict de-
duction. Sometimes this merely signifies the absence 
of premises that could be provided readily enough; at 
others it signifies a fundamentally incomplete account, 
one which would require serious investigation to fill out 
and finally deny or affirm. Since Gombrich, of course, 
does not write in the formal language of logic, the 
question becomes whether his explanations, bolstered 
by reasonable and ready assumptions, really imply 
what they try to explain. 
Gombrich's Basic Concepts 
This obvious danger in a book with a title like The 
Sense of Order is that no good account could be given 
of so fuzzy-sounding a concept. Indeed, Gombrich 
himself runs shy of stating just what sorts of order he 
means: 
I certainly would not venture. to define the concept of order 
I use in the main title of this book, but I trust it will bring out 
the feature which interests me in decorative design. The 
arrangement of elements according to similarity and differ-
ence and the enjoyment of repetition and symmetry ex-
tend from the string of beads to the layout of the page in 
front of the reader, and, of course, beyond to the rhythms 
of movement, speech and music, not to mention the struc-
tures of society and the systems of thought. [p. x] 
Instead of a definition we get a tour. However, vague 
boundaries or not, Gombrich's sense of order turns 
out to have a more substantial center to it than one 
might at first think. 
Gombrich bases his sense of order on Karl Pop-
per's analysis of scientific inquiry, opening his in-
troduction with a quote from the philosopher: '' It was 
first in animals and children, but later also in adults, 
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that I observed the immensely powerful need for regu-
larity-the need which makes them seek for regular-
ities'' (p. 1 ). In Popper's concept of inquiry, as 
adopted by Gombrich, understanding is a product not 
just of an order-seeking, but an order-presuming, 
process, in which simple orderings are hypothesized 
until disconfirmed by later experience. The world is 
known, so far as it can be known, through active ex-
ploration based on hypotheses revised only as they 
conflict with new data. Furthermore, it seems that or-
ganisms have to proceed in this way most of the time, 
for to behave otherwise would waste too much time 
and energy on needless hypothesizing or would ignore 
counterevidence. A third alternative, to depend on di-
rect knowledge of the world, is ultimately unintelligible, 
no real alternative at all. Gombrich stresses, in com-
pany with contemporary psychologists interested in 
perception-Uirich Neisser and Richard Gregory, for 
instance-that this hypothesis-making, order-oriented 
way of proceeding, and the love of order that accom-
panies it, must operate as much at the perceptual level 
as at the level of extended intellectual inquiry. 
But, paradoxically, while order is precious, so is 
disorder. According to Popper, disconfirmation 
strongly informs, by decisively knocking out hypothe-
ses, that confirmation can never inform by letting pass 
hypotheses which might later prove faulty. To make 
the most of its capacity to presume orderliness, the in-
quiring organism must be predisposed to seek out 
breaks in the order-to put the hypothesis at risk and 
see how it fares. This stands behind what Gombrich 
calls ''the most basic fact of aesthetic experience, the 
fact that delight lies somewhere between boredom and 
confusion" (p. 9). 
Returning to the question of explanation: Are the 
principles of order-hypothesizing and disconfirmation-
seeking, which are founded, on a thoughtful account 
of the nature of knowledge, adequate to explain the 
human attraction to decorative design? No doubt there 
is room for debate, but at least the explanatory prin-
ciples have some backing, and perhaps they do imply 
an attraction to decoration. The intelligent organism, 
like the most ignorant amoeba, will have to proceed 
according to Popper's epistemology. We can assume 
that this intelligent organism will have drives, and ac-
companying emotions, which move it to apply the hy-
pothesis-making strategy perceptually and in other 
ways, else it would never have become intelligent. We 
can assume the intelligent organism will have the 
power to arrange things and make things. So, for any 
intelligent organism, some sort of patterning would be 
bound to stimulate its Popperian mind simply as pat-
tern, and, being intelligent, motivated, and capable, 
the organism would make such things to enjoy them. In 
short, Martians would have wallpaper, or some 
unearthly equivalent, though of course we humans 
might not like it at all. 
Now I'm well aware that some of the assumptions 
leading to this conclusion could be challenged. But the 
important point here is that Popper's epistemology 
does seem to imply Gombrich's sense of order, espe-
cially the responsiveness to pattern that it articulates. 
If the implication is not strict, neither is it far-fetched, 
and Gombrich's sense of order comes closer to satis-
fying the deductive requirement for explanation than at 
first seems probable. 
Another explanatory concept Gombrich employs is 
habit. Gombrich notes that under the influence of habit 
decorations have changed slowiy. Radical invention is 
nonexistent, considerable invention the exception, and 
the gradual evolution of decorative motifs, some of 
which can be traced back for millenia, the rule. 
Gombrich draws an analogy here to the role of sche-
mata in representational art and their gradual develop-
ment, as discussed in his Art and Illusion. But he notes 
a contrast as well. Where the quest for realism gave 
the development of those representational schemata a 
definite direction, the influences on decorative sche-
mata have been much more diffuse, and a unified ac 
count of why decorations have changed as they have 
becomes difficult. Nonetheless, Gombrich explores 
various approaches. 
Although habit extends Gombrich's explanatory ar-
mamentum, it is more a corollary than an addition to it, 
for, as he points out, ''The force of habit may be said 
to spring from the sense of order'' (p. 171 ). Habit 
really amounts to a temporal sense of order analogous 
to the spatial sense of order exhibited in wallpaper and 
fluted columns for example. That today's world will be 
more or less like yesterday's is the hypothesis the per-
ceiver projects, the hypothesis that allows him to make 
sense of a world which otherwise would be cluttered 
and confusing. "In the study of perception," Gombrich 
says, ''the force of habit makes itself felt in the greater 
ease with which we take in the familiar" (p. 171 ). Pre-
sumably, in analogy to the spatial sense of order, this 
hypothesis is also one which the perceiver expects will 
be a little bit disconfirmed. 
But does Gombrich's basic idea really explain the 
role of habits? In particular, does it imply that habits 
are required? Why couldn't some creature-our Mar-
tian, say-instead of relying on a repertoire of stan-
dard schemata, extrapolate the individual experiences 
of the past to directly comprehend current events, 
much as we, in perceiving the symmetry of a design, 
extrapolate from one side of the design to the other? 
The answer is practical, rather than epistemological. 
While the sense of order per se arises because the or-
ganism must, logically, proceed by hypotheses, habits 
arise because the organism must, in all practicality, 
crystallize some of those hypotheses into habits. The 
amount of computation required to match past experi-
ences, unsorted, uncategorized, unschematized, 
against current ones for a "good fit" would be un-
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manageable. Gombrich himself does not make this ar-
gument, but the basic explanatory construct again 
tends to imply the phenomena it is invoked to ex-
plain-the force of habit and, in turn, the gradual evo-
lution of decorative designs. 
Perhaps here is a good place to ask: Why all this 
philosophy? Why spend so many sentences examining 
the abstract force of Gombrich's explanatory appa-
ratus? The reason is that I think this clarifies Gom-
brich's ambition, even though I have made it more ex-
plicit than he. Gombrich is very concerned to offer 
really basic explanations. He persistently tries to ac-
count for the perceptual phenomena associated with 
decorative design in terms fundamental to our under-
standing of what it is to be an intelligent organism. 
Gombrich in effect assaults the barrier between the 
touchy-feely world of aesthetics and the tough busi-
ness of practical intelligence, seeking to root the one 
in the other, as of course other authors have done in 
their own ways. Furthermore, he has not done badly 
at it. 
Some Points of Order 
Of course, not all characteristics of human aesthetic 
response will stem from basic principles of intelligent 
information processing. For one thing, the human or-
ganism seems too much an accident, too much one in-
telligence among possible others that might use the 
same principles in different ways and prove responsive 
to somewhat different patterns. As noted before, the 
Martian's wallpaper needn't please us at all. Gombrich 
is well aware of such limits, and emphasizes how little 
one can predict about the effects on the viewer of a vi-
sual design: Bigger or smaller, chosen to be familiar or 
unfamiliar, presented in times of one fashion or an-
other, the same design may inspire radically different 
reactions. Gombrich could, of course, have said that 
this, too, is part of the sense of order, order over time, 
within culture, and so on. But, laudably, he refrains. 
The problem is that any effects of size, culture, and so 
on could be accommodated just as well as any other. 
This is the same as saying that the implication condi-
tion emphasized earlier fails, the sense of vacu-
, ousness we get from such explanations apparently re-
flecting the failure. 
The existence of such general problems does not 
1 mean that Gombrich refrains from offering ex-
planations for particular phenomena, however. On the 
1 contrary, he usually tries. One interesting example is 
1 his notion of what he calls a ''field of force,'' in me-
l taphorical, but only metaphorical, reference to the 
thinking of the Gestaltists. Gombrich's field of force 
concerils arrangements with a center and a decorative 
I border and emphasizes two effects: those things con-
: stituting a design in the border tend to lose their indi-
, vidual qualities and to direct attention toward the cen-
79 
ter; those things in the center, on the other hand, tend 
to have their individual qualities emphasized. Gom-
brich illustrates this with numerous examples, perhaps 
most charmingly by a cake decorated with cherries. 
The cherries around the rim seem less flavorful mor-
sels and more a frame. However, "The cherry in the 
centre of the cake is very much a cherry'' (p. 1 56). 
What about our principle of deduction? Does 
Gombrich's field of force concept pass this test of ex-
planatory adequacy? Yes, it does. The field of force 
simply posits general characteristics of situations 
where there are a center and a border and makes de-
ductive predictions in individual cases like the cake. 
The particular is subsumed under and implied by the 
general. Put this way, the field of force is simply a low-
level inductive generalization, much narrower than 
Gombrich's overriding sense of order, and not 
grounded in the basic character of an intelligent orga-
nism. But explanation it still is. 
However, this will not do for Gombrich. He is deter-
mined to relate the field of force to his sense of order. 
His efforts afford a good opportunity both to explore 
cautiously the vertical architecture of his concepts and 
to test whether the details are as sturdy as the broad 
structure seems. So again, we start from the field of 
force. The weakened identity of elements on a border 
is in fact one example of a more general phenomenon: 
the weakened identity of any repeated unit in a large 
design. Gombrich discusses this phenomenon exten-
sively, noting, for example, how the multiple faces of 
Andy Warhol's Marilyn Monroe become drained of 
identity. Gombrich elsewhere asserts a related notion, 
that scanty apprehension of individual parts is inherent 
to the nature of design. ''To expect that we read every 
motif in the Alhambra as we read a book is not only un-
realistic. It is contrary to the spirit of decoration, which 
offers us a feast for the eye without demanding that we 
should taste of every dish" {p. 1 03). Gombrich has this 
to say about how the perceiver normally encounters a 
design: "Faced with an array of identical objects ... 
we rapidly form the preliminary hypothesis that we are 
confronted with a lawful assembly, and we need only 
sample the elements for redundancies by sweeping 
our eye along the whole series and just taking in one 
repeating component" (p. 151 ). All of this, of course, 
relates to the overarching Popperian view. 
Gombrich's conceptual notions certainly relate to 
one another and certainly help us assemble a coherent 
conception of the perceptual response to decorative 
design. However, they do not quite relate to one an-
other in an explanatory way. Consider, for example, 
the connection between the field of force and the more 
general vitiation of identity that comes with patterned 
repetition. The latter implies the weakened individ-
uality of the border elements in the field of force, but 
does not at all imply the enhancement of the center. 
Gombrich makes an effort to bridge this gap, suggest-
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ing that the enhancement of the center might follow 
from the tendency of the viewer to survey the order in 
the most effective way: ''In the kaleidoscope the radial 
symmetry pulls the eye toward the centre from which 
redundancies are most easily surveyed.'' The sugges-
tion seems to be that Gombrich's general concepts, 
plus an efficiency principle, send the eye to the center. 
But are redundancies in fact most efficiently surveyed 
from the center? Symmetries seem most easily sam-
pled by skipping the center and fixating the sides alter-
nately. To sample the redundancies of cyclic repetition 
in the border design, one would best scan around the 
periphery rather than making multiple trips from the 
center to various points on the border. True, the entire 
border is kept in peripheral view best by fixating the 
center. Perhaps that peripheral view provides all the 
sample the perceiver needs, but this is hard to say, 
since nothing in the general concepts predicts how 
much is needed. The pull toward the center referred to 
by Gombrich seems real enough, but not explained by, 
because not plausibly implied by, the aim of efficiently 
sampling the redundant border. 
For another example, consider how the vitiating ef-
fect of repetition in general relates to Gombrich's 
broader point, that we need not and do not inspect 
decorations for their details. Certainly, the latter 
doesn't imply the former. It's not just that we don't 
need to scrutinize the individual elements, but that the 
display resists our doing so, even when we try. Gom-
brich tries to relate this resistance to his general con-
cepts by positing a kind of rivalry: ''There must be a 
conflict, or at least a tension, between the two func-
tions of perception to which we referred at the outset, 
the perception of things and the perception of order'' 
(p. 151 ). But Gombrich's general concepts, even with 
this conflict added, still do not imply the repetition phe-
nomenon, in particular that "thingness" would be the 
loser in cases of conflict. Why ''thingness'' is the 
loser, or indeed whether it always has to be, remains 
uncertain. Furthermore, Gombrich's proposal of con-
flict is confusing in another way. He seems to forget 
here what he maintains in discussing habit, that the 
perception of things also is part of the perception of 
order. The conflict is not between order and thing so 
much as between one kind of order, design narrowly 
taken, and another, familiarity. 
Such difficulties arise not infrequently throughout 
The Sense of Order. Many explanations are not so 
readily filled out to yield plausible deductive accounts, 
and sometimes, as above, we have outright inconsis-
tencies. Although Gombrich's particular and general 
concepts make a coherent overall picture, they do not 
lock together into a seamless explanatory structure. 
Such flaws should not be viewed as ruinous, how-
ever. On the contrary, one would hardly expect a tight 
scientific account of such a complex domain. Gom-
brich no doubt wrote his book somewhat like a decora-
tive design, not to be scrutinized detail by detail any-
way, and even incomplete explanations do valuable 
service in pointing the way to further inquiry. More-
over, a more conservative and cautious Gombrich 
might be one less worth having, if it costs the drive to-
ward explanation, even though not always solid ex-
planation, which so infuses The Sense of Order. And 
Gombrich himself is frank about the limits of what he 
attempts: ''I am fully aware of the fact that specula-
tions, as yet unsupported by controlled experiments, 
cannot qualify as psychological theories. But what 
starts as a mere 'hunch' can sometimes be turned into 
a scientific hypothesis in expert hands, and I have 
been so fortunate as to see this happen with informal 
suggestions I have put forward in the past'' (p. ix). So 
Gombrich has issued this caveat emptor, and the 
reader should take heed. 
A Note of the Explanandum 
The explanandum in an explanation is the thing to be 
accounted for. It is, in Gombrich's The Sense of Order, 
a range of phenomena concerned with decorative de-
sign. But why this explanandum? Is this where we 
would like to see E. H. Gombrich investing his time and 
intelligence? To put the question that way is to show 
how unfair a question it is: Can an author not choose 
his own work? But to address the question anyway is 
to provide a little more perspective on what The Sense 
of Order attempts and what it eschews. 
One thing Gombrich does not attempt is an account 
of aesthetic excellence in design. True, he describes 
the different attitudes which have prevailed toward 
such matters as functionalism, or as flatness versus 
three-dimensionality. True, he takes as central to qual-
ity a provocative balance between order and disorder. 
Certainly the abundant illustrations present to the 
reader many lovely examples of decoration. Yet 
Gombrich never tries to argue that this is superb and 
that abysmal according to the logic of his concepts. If 
Gombrich instructs us in the connoisseurship of deco-
ration, it is in terms of what effects to see, not what val-
ues to apply. Some might consider this an appalling 
neglect of what is really important. But, instead, it 
might be considered the wisdom of explaining what 
can be explained and letting the rest go hang. As 
quoted earlier, Gombrich specifically acknowledges 
the difficulties of any general aesthetics of design. To 
this reviewer's mind, Gombrich is right: Particular dif-
ferences in aesthetic quality defy any ready ex-
planation by general principles. Rules of thumb can be 
given, of course, but as explanation, they fail the test 
of implication emphasized here, being too subject to 
exception. 
Another thing Gombrich does not attempt is a gen-
eral account of the visual phenomena of abstract art. 
True, Gombrich notes that the theories behind twenti-
Reviews and Discussion 
eth-century abstract painting draw considerably on the 
debates about ornament in the nineteenth century. 
True, he occasionally offers contemporary abstrac-
tions as examples of some of the effects discussed . 
However, Gombrich draws a fundamental distinction 
between such matters and his aim: " Remembering my 
own normal reaction to decoration before I had em-
barked on this investigation, I was tempted to call this 
book 'The Unregarded Art.' ... Painting, like speaking, 
implicitly demands attention whether or not it receives 
it. Decoration cannot make this demand. It normally 
depends for its effect on the fluctuating attention we 
can spare while we scan our surroundings'' (p. 116). 
So Gombrich, no great fan of abstract painting (1963), 
has chosen to complement his study of realistic repre-
sentation in Art and Illusion with a study not of those 
abstractions and semiabstractions that hang on the 
important walls of important museums and mansions, 
but of the ones that hug coffee spoons and archi-
tectural columns, the ones we take for granted. 
One could regret this. I confess myself to a moment 
of regret when, halfway through The Sense of Order, I 
happened to visit the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard 
University. On display was a Calder piece, standing on 
the floor about chest high, its top a horizontal gesture 
of wires and metal plates pivoting on the base. For 
some reason, I found it wholly engaging. Not only did it 
allow, even compel, my regard, but it departed strik-
ingly from the perceptual armamentarium of ornamen-
tal design. There was little repetition in a narrow 
sense. There was calculated asymmetry. The curvilin-
earities were complex, but within the reach of vision to 
know them one by one and all together, a feast for the 
eye where one could consume every dish, to reverse 
Gombrich's expression. "This," I said to myself, "has 
nothing to do with the sense of order." 
But in the end there were no regrets. The old saying 
about gift horses seems relevant here. E. H. Gombrich 
has made us his gift, and there is no need to grumble 
about how he could have done this or could have done 
that. He has, in fact, chosen a neglected corner of our 
vision and sought to illuminate it for us. The point is 
nicely made by the way he frames his discussion-
with a discussion of a picture frame. At the close of his 
introduction, Gombrich has a few remarks to make 
about an elaborate picture frame, circa 1700, sur-
rounding the Madonna della Sedia by Raphael. 
Gombrich says, in part, '' ... on the face of it, it seems 
an extraordinarily pointless activity to expend so much 
skill and labour on carving and gilding these festoons 
with laurel leaves and berries, stretched between fic-
titious curly brackets of extraordinary elaboration, 
which fasten them between shell-shaped forms'' (p. 
15). 8-~t by the end of the last chapter, Gombrich is 
ready to return with his readers of more informed per-
ception to this same frame. "To the reader who has 
shared this journey with me it should have looked pro-
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gressively less puzzling. We recognize in it a version of 
the cartouche with four animated motifs oriented to-
ward the field of force they enhance. They are proge-
nies of Gorgon's heads ... "And so on. Yes, the 
frame has become more meaningful, one's vision less 
naive, in consequence of the rite of passage imposed 
by The Sense of Order. 
Note 
1 This review was prepared at Project Zero , Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, with support from the Spencer Foundation . The opinions ex-
pressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of sup-
porting agencies. 
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That there is an essentially metaphorical component in 
many diverse realms of symbolic behavior has become 
a popular, and even fashionable, concept, and thus it 
seems particularly timely to consider some of the phil-
osophical implications of the concept of metaphor it-
self. The publication of this latest collection of essays, 
which had originally appeared as an issue of Critical 
Inquiry, should serve to alert scholars to the richness 
of contemporary thinking on metaphor that can gener-
ally benefit discussions of symbolic phenomena. While 
much of the debate in this volume is aimed explicitly at 
problems in literary communication, this approach 
should not prevent a fruitful extension to related issues 
in other fields. Furthermore, the concept of metaphor 
is not only relevant to the objects we seek to under-
stand but sheds considerable light on the very process 
of analysis. Metaphor, then, seems doubly relevant: It 
clarifies the structure of certain forms of symbolic 
communication and theories about communication as 
well. 
Many readers, however, may encounter some diffi-
culty in reading these essays: A good deal of knowl-
